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I. INTRODUCTION
2
Rape shield statutes were enacted in order to protect the rape victim from
embarrassment and humiliation at the trial of the accused by restricting the
admission of sexual conduct evidence.3 While these statutes, for the most part,
4
succeed in protecting the victim and encouraging her to report the rape, they can
have the effect of limiting the accused's ability to defend himself.
Currently, Federal Rule of Evidence 412', the federal rape shield law, excludes
evidence of the victim's prior sexual activity with persons other than the defendant
6
even if it tends to show that the victim has an ulterior motive to fabricate charges.
7
The law excludes this evidence unless its admission is constitutionally compelled.
Rule 412 allows a defendant to introduce evidence of the alleged victim's prior
8
sexual history only if its exclusion would violate his constitutional rights.
9
Maryland's rape shield statute, on the other hand, contains an explicit exception
for evidence that supports a claim that the victim may have a motive to fabricate the
charges.'" The statute, however, does not admit all evidence that may show an
ulterior motive. Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that the evidence is relevant
and material to an issue in the case and that its probative value outweighs its
prejudicial nature."
Part II of this article discusses the advent of rape shield statutes in the United
States. Part III examines case law construing the statutes with regard to prior sexual
conduct as evidence of a motive to fabricate. Finally, Part IV proposes to amend the
Federal Rule to include an exception similar to that of the Maryland Rape Shield
Statute, which permits the admission of evidence that supports a claim that the
victim has an ulterior motive in accusing the defendant.

2

1n this paper, the words "victim," "complainant," "accuser," and "alleged victim" are
used interchangeably to describe the person who has accused another of rape or sexual assault.
In addition, the words "accused" and "defendant" are used to describe the person on trial for
the alleged crime.
3

David Haxton, Comment, Rape Shield Statutes. ConstitutionalDespite Unconstitutional

Exclusions of Evidence, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1219-20 (1985).
4

1d.

5

See infra note 37 and accompanying text.

6

Federal Rule of Evidence 412 does not contain an exception that explicitly allows
evidence of an ulterior motive on the part of the defendant. Therefore, the statute excludes
such evidence.
7

FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(I)(C).

8

1d.

9

MD. CODE ANN., Sexual Offenses, § 461A (1982). See infra note 43.
'0§ 461A(a)(3). See infra note 43.
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II. THE HISTORY OF RAPE SHIELD STATUTES
A. Common Law

The common law rules of evidence allowed evidence of the victim's past sexual
conduct to be admitted at trial. 2 Such evidence, particularly the victim's chastity or
lack thereof, was admissible as a means of proving her consent or absence of
consent.' 3 A woman's lack of chastity also was admissible in order to attack her
credibility, 4 due to the belief that "promiscuity purports dishonesty."' 5 The
defendant had the right to attack the credibility of the victim in this manner, while a
similar attack on his credibility was considered too prejudicial.' 6
Traditional rape laws also required testimony both to demonstrate that the victim
18
17
had physically resisted her attacker and to corroborate the victim's testimony.
The common law required corroboration because of the belief that a woman would
fabricate charges of rape as a means of explaining pregnancy, premarital sex, and
disease. 9 Testimony also needed to be corroborated because of the belief that a
woman would accuse a man of rape in order to retaliate against him.2' Therefore, the
prosecution had to provide corroborative evidence of such essential elements as the
identity of the accused, penetration, and nonconsent. 2'

12SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 31-37 (1987).

' 3 Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence: State and Federal, § 449 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995).
See also Pamela J. Fisher, State v. Alvey: Iowa 's Victimization of Defendants Through the
Overextension of Iowa's Rape Shield Law, 76 IOWA L. REV. 835 (1991) (evidence of the
victim's past sexual behavior may reflect a lack of chastity in the victim from which the jury
could infer assent).
' 4Shawn J. Wallach, Rape Shield Laws: Protecting the Victim at the Expense of the
Defendant's ConstitutionalRights, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 485, 487 (1997).
15Fisher, supra note 13, at 838.
'

6

ESTRICH, supra note 12, at 52.

7

1 CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTs REVOLUTION AND
ITS IMPACT, 17 (1992). See also ESTRICH, supra note 12, at 31-37. The physical resistance

requirement, also called "utmost resistance," was "explained as doing no more than describing
the natural response of a woman, or at least a woman of any virtue, to sex that was truly
unwanted." Id. The need to show resistance, under the common law, varied between
jurisdictions and, in those jurisdictions that used the resistance requirement, varied among
cases as well. Id. Many jurisdictions required a showing of resistance in cases where the
accused was an acquaintance, an employer, and a white man; convictions of these types of
accused were overturned due to lack of resistance. Id. On the other hand, where the accused
was a stranger, a black man, or where the accused was armed, the victim was excused from
resistance. Id.
'gESTRICH, supra note 12, at 31-37.
191d.
20

Id.

2

Id.at 24.
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These common law rules resulted in the notorious abuse of rape victims by the
legal system. 22 "[Alggressive defense counsel ...essentially put the victim on
trial"23 by forcing her to answer intrusive and embarrassing questions about her
morality and sexuality that often were meant to demean and humiliate her. 4 This
character assassination led to a decrease in the number of reported rapes.2 5
B. The Adoption of Rape Shield Statutes
As a result of the women's movement of the 1960's,26 as well as the support of
law enforcement agencies, 2 7 pressure for reform of rape laws grew.2" During the
1970s,29 Congress and state legislatures began enacting statutes in order to protect
victims of rape3" and sexual assault from being questioned about their prior sexual
conduct."
The statutes were enacted with the intention of shielding victims from
the embarrassment and harassment caused by testifying about past sexual conduct. 2
Victims were thereby encouraged to report the crime and to testify at trial33 without
being required to justify their conduct. 4
Although rape shield statutes vary between jurisdictions, 3 the laws are similar in
generally prohibiting the admission of all evidence pertaining to the victim's past
sexual conduct and, then, providing exceptions to the stated rule of inadmissibility.36
The Federal Rule of Evidence 412, which is typical of such statutes, provides:
Sex Offense Cases; Relevance of Alleged Victim's Past Sexual Behavior or
Alleged Sexual Predisposition
22

See Commonwealth v. Nieves, 582 A.2d 341, 346 (Pa. 1990); Rebekah Smith,
Comment, Protecting The Victim: Rape and Sexual Harassment Shields Under Maine And
FederalLaw, 49 ME. L. REV. 443, 445 (1997).
23
Nieves, 582 A.2d at 346.
24
Smith, supra note 22, at 445.
25Fisher, supra note 13, at 838.
26
Id.at 839.
27Wallach,

supra note 14, at 489.

28

1d.

29

The first rape shield statute was enacted in Michigan in 1974. Jason M. Price, Note,

Constitutional Law--Sex, Lies, and Rape Shield Statutes: The Constitutionality of Interpreting
Rape Shield Statutes to Exclude Evidence Relating to the Victim 'sMotive to Fabricate, 18 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 541, 551 (1996). Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 412 in

1978. Id.
30

Wallach, supra note 14, at 488.

31

Haxton, supra note 3, at 1219.

3

bId.

33

1d.

34

Wallach, supra note 14, at 489.
35Fisher, supra note 13, at 840.
36

Haxton, supra note 3, at 1220.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998

5

1998]

RAPE SHIELD STATUTES

(a)
Evidence Generally Inadmissible. The following evidence is not
admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual
misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other
sexual behavior; and
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition.
(b)
Exceptions.
(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if
otherwise admissible under these rules:
(A)
evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged
victim offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the source
of semen, injury, or other physical evidence;
(B)
evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged
victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered
by the accused to prove consent or by the prosecution; and
(C)
evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional
rights of the defendant.
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior
or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is
otherwise admissible under these rules and its probative value
substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of
unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim's
reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy
by the alleged victim.
(c)

Procedure to Determine Admissibility.
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b)
must(A)
file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically
describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered
unless the court, for good cause requires a different time for filing or
permits filing during trial; and
(B)
serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged victim or,
when appropriate, the alleged victim's guardian or representative.
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must
conduct a hearing in camera and afford the victim and parties
a right to attend and be heard. The motion, related papers, and
the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal
unless the court orders otherwise. 7
While the Federal Rule generally excludes evidence of the victim's past sexual
conduct, it provides several exceptions for evidence that is considered relevant."
These exceptions permit evidence of the victim's sexual history if it is offered to
prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or

37

R. EVID. 412.
Wallach, supra note 14, at 495.

FED.

38
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other physical evidence39 or if it is evidence of past sexual conduct between the
defendant and the victim offered by the defendant to prove consent.40 The rule also
contains a "catch-all" provision that authorizes the court to use its discretion in
admitting evidence for which there is otherwise no exception.4 Despite falling
under an exception, permissible evidence may be excluded, however, if the evidence
would be excluded under another federal rule. 2
While the current federal rule contains several exceptions, the rule does not
contain an exception that otherwise allows the accused to introduce evidence that the
accuser has a reason or motive to lie or fabricate charges of rape. 3
39

FED.

R. EVID. 412(b)(l)(A).

The physical evidence exception of Federal Rule of

Evidence 412 is a remainder of the common law corroboration requirement. See supra note
19 and accompanying text.
40

R. EVID. 412(b)(l)(B).

41

R. EVID. 412(b)(l)(C).,

FED.
FED.

42

FED. R. EvID. 412(b)(1).

43

An example of a rape shield law with a specific exception for evidence of a motive to lie
is, article 27, section 461A of the Maryland Code, also known as Maryland's Rape Shield
Statute, which states:
461A Admissibility of evidence in rape cases.
(a) Evidence relating to victim's chastity. - Evidence relating to a victim's reputation
for chastity and opinion evidence relating to a victim's chastity are not admissible in
any prosecution for commission of a rape or sexual offense in the first or second
degree, or attempted rape or attempted sexual offense in the first or second degree.
Evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual conduct may be admitted
only if the judge finds the evidence is relevant and is material to a fact in issue in the
case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative
value, and if the evidence is:
(I) Evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the defendant; or
(2) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of
semen, pregnancy, disease, or trauma; or
(3) Evidence which supports a claim that the victim has an ulterior motive in accusing
the defendant of the crime; or
(4) Evidence offered for the purpose of impeachment when the prosecutor puts the
victim's prior sexual conduct in issue.
(b) In camera hearing. - Any evidence described in subsection (a) of this section, may
not be referred to in any statements to a jury nor introduced at trial without the court
holding a prior in camera hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence. If
new information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the
evidence described in subsection (a) admissible, the court may order an in camera
hearing to determine the admissibility of the proposed evidence under subsection (a).
Oregon, Texas, and Virginia rape shield statutes also contain an ulterior motive exception:
OR. R. EVIo. 412(2)(b)(A) (excepts from exclusion evidence that "relates to the motive or bias
of the alleged vicitm ... "); TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 412(b)(2)(C) (semble); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-67.7(B) (Michie 1988):
Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit the accused from presenting evidence
relevant to show that the complaining witness had a motive to fabricate the charge
against the accused. If such evidence relates to the past sexual conduct of the
complaining witness with a person other than the accused, it shall not be admitted and
may not be referred to at any preliminary hearing or trial unless the party offering [the]
same files a written notice generally describing the evidence prior to the introduction
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III.

EVIDENCE OF A VICTIM'S MOTIVE TO FABRICATE

Rape shield laws may preclude a defendant accused of sexual misconduct from
presenting a plausible explanation as to why his accuser would falsely accuse him.
Because of the exclusionary aspect of the federal rule and its lack of a specific
exception for a motive to fabricate, a defendant is forced to use the "catch-all"
exception- that a constitutional violation will occur due to the exclusion of such
evidence." The defendant primarily argues that his Sixth Amendment right has been
violated as a result of the exclusion. 5
A. The Supreme Court Precedent of Olden v. Kentucky"6
The United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the issue of a
criminal defendant's constitutional right to "[expose] ...a witness's motivation in
testifying" in a rape case in Olden v. Kentucky. 7 In Olden, the defendant, an
African-American, was indicted on kidnapping, rape, and forcible sodomy charges.4
The victim was a young white woman named Matthews. At trial, she testified that
she was at a bar with a friend, and after having an argument with the friend, left with
the defendant.49 Matthews then testified that the defendant drove her to another
location, threatened her at knifepoint, raped, and sodomized her."0 She also claimed
that he raped her a second time." Matthews testified that, afterwards, at her request,
the defendant dropped her off near Bill Russell's house. 2
At the time of the alleged rape, Matthews and Russell were married to and living
with other people but were having an extramarital affair. 3 By the time the case came
to trial, Matthews and Russell, who was also an African-American, were separated
from their spouses and living together." The defendant argued at trial that Matthews
concocted the rape story to protect her relationship with Russell, who would have
grown suspicious upon seeing her disembark from the car. 5 In order to demonstrate
of any evidence, or the opening statement of either counsel, whichever first occurs, at
the preliminary hearing or trial at which the admission may be sought. Id.
44Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1994) (the defendant stated that his
constitutional rights were violated as a result of the exclusion of evidence of the victim's
motive to fabricate).
45See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988). See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
46
Olden, 488 U.S. at 227, 231.
7

4 1d.

481d. at 228.

49/d.
50

1d.

51

Olden, 488 U.S. at 228.

52

1d.

53

Id. at 229.

54

1d. at 230.

55

1d.
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Matthews' motive to lie, the defendant sought to introduce evidence of Matthews
and Russell's current cohabitation, but the trial court, in ruling on a motion in
limine,56 decided to keep that information from the jury.57
On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that Kentucky's rape shield law5"
did not absolutely bar evidence of Matthews and Russell's living arrangement.5 The
court found, however, that while the proffered evidence was relevant to the
defendant's theory of the case,' the potential prejudice of the evidence outweighed
62
its probative value,6 and held, therefore, that the trial court properly excluded it.
The court reasoned that the admission of testimony that Matthews and Russell were
living together at the time of the trial "may have created extreme prejudice against
Matthews."6
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Kentucky Court of
Appeals' decision and remanded the case for an assessment of whether the trial court
impermissibly infringed upon the defendant's Sixth Amendment64 right "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him,"65 including the right to conduct
reasonable cross-examination. 66 The Court held that the relevant factors in making
this assessment included "the importance of the [victim's] testimony in the
prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence
of evidence corroborating ... the [victim's testimony] ... the extent of crossexamination otherwise permitted, and ... the overall strength of the prosecution's
case."67 In considering these factors, the Supreme Court could not conclude that the

56

Most rape shield statutes contain a provision stating that evidence relating to the victim's
sexual history must be heard at an in camera hearing to determine its admissibility. See FED.
R. EvID. 412(c).
57
Olden, 488 U.S. at 230.
58

See Ky. ST. REV. RULE 412 (1992) (original version at Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 510.145

(Michie 1985) (repealed 1992)).
59

01den, 488 U.S. at 230.

60

1d.
61

l.

62

Id. The Kentucky statute restricts the admissibility of evidence of the victim's sexual
history to that which is admissible under "any other provision of law." Ky. ST. REV. RULE

412(b). The Court of Appeals applied this restriction in determining that the evidence was
properly excluded.
63
Olden, 488 U.S. at 231.
6U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to ... be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
65

id"

66

Olden, 488 U.S. at 231, citing, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974).
Id. at 233, quoting, Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).

67
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restriction on the 68 defendant's right to confrontation was harmless "beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Relying on its decision in Davis v. Alaska,69 the Supreme Court stated that
"cross-examination [is] designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of
the witness, and thereby '. . . expose to the jury the facts from which jurors

. . .

could

appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness."' 70 The Court
held that a "reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression
of [the victim's] credibility had [defense counsel] been permitted to pursue his
proposed line of cross-examination."'"
In recognizing a defendant's right to present evidence of the victim's motive, the
Supreme Court realized that the trial court may impose limits on the defense's
inquiry into the complainant's potential bias.72 The Court concluded that the
limitations should be applied to take into account such factors as "harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that [would
be] repetitive or only marginally relevant."73 In essence, the Court held that Federal
Rule of Evidence 403"4 dictated the limitation on a defense counsel's inquiry.
However, in applying these limitations to Olden, the Court concluded that the
limitations imposed on the inquiry "[were] beyond reason. 15
In Olden, the Supreme Court recognized that it was a violation of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause to prevent a defendant from presenting testimony
that tends to show a victim's motive to fabricate, even if the testimony is of the
victim's prior sexual conduct.
6

d. The Court relied on the standard of review set by the Van Arsdall Court. See Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684.
69415 U.S. 308 (1974). In Davis, the key witness in a trial for burglary and grand larceny
was a juvenile who was on probation for a previous burglary. Id at 320-21. The prosecutor
sought a protective order to prevent the juvenile's record from being admitted at trial. The
defendant objected, stating that he only intended to introduce the juvenile's record to
demonstrate that he identified the defendant out of fear that his probation would be revoked.
Id at 311. The trial court issued the protective order in accordance with the state's statute that
prohibited the admission of a juvenile's record in court. Id.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision on the grounds that
the trial judge had violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse
witnesses. Id at 320-21. The Court found that the state's interests in protecting the privacy of
a juvenile are not outweighed by the constitutional right of a defendant to effectively crossexamine adverse witnesses with regard to bias or improper motive. Davis, 415 U.S. at 350.
70
Olden, 488 U.S. at 231, citing, Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), quoting,
Davis, 415 U.S. at 318.
71
Olden, 488 U.S. at 232, quoting, Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680.
72

1d.

73Id., quoting, Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679.
74Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
71Olden, 488 U.S. at 232.
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B. Case Law Supporting the Admission of Evidence ofa Victim's Sexual History to
Prove a Motive to Fabricate
Many courts, including those in Oregon, Massachusetts, and New Mexico, have
followed the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Olden by admitting evidence of
a victim's prior sexual conduct to prove her motive to fabricate charges against the
defendant.
1. Oregon
76

In an Oregon case, the defendant was indicted for three counts of first degree
sodomy."7 After a mistrial, the forty-year-old defendant was retried on charges that
8
he had engaged in and attempted a variety of sexual acts with a ten-year-old girl."
The defendant denied the charges, contending that the girl falsely accused him after
he learned that she had been sexually active with his thirteen-year-old son, and two
other people. 9 He claimed that the girl accused him after he had informed her that
he was going to tell her parents. "
During the first trial, defense counsel had alluded to the defendant's claims in his
opening statement. This led to a mistrial because the state argued, and the trial court
1
agreed, that the statements were in violation of Oregon's rape shield statute."
During the second trial, the defendant was found guilty. He appealed, arguing that
the second trial was barred due to double jeopardy. In deciding this issue, the
Oregon Court of Appeals had to decide whether the evidence the defendant sought to
introduce was properly excluded. The court held that the evidence was offered to
establish an "inference, not inherently unreasonable, that the complainant had a
8 2
motive to and did falsely accuse" the defendant of sexual assault.
at trial.8 3 When
being
admitted
from
the
evidence
statute
prohibited
The Oregon
4
the court of appeals applied the holding of Davis v. Alaska, however, it found that
the Oregon law violated the defendant's right to confrontation by prohibiting
5
As a result, the court held that the trial
evidence of the victim's ulterior motive.

76

State v. Jalo, 557 P.2d 1359 (Or. 1976) (en banc). The Jalo court followed the holding
in Davis when it made its ruling in this case. Olden, which was decided after Jalo, followed
Davis as well. See, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
77
jalo, 557 P.2d at 1360.
78

1d.

79

1d. The defendant alleged that, in addition to his son, the girl had been sexually active
with a young boy and one of her uncles.
80

1d.

8

'5ee

OR. REV. STAT. § 163.475(3) (1975) (repealed by 1981 c.892 S 98). Oregon's
current rape shield statute contains an exception that admits evidence of a victim's motive or
bias. See OR. R. EVID. 412(2)(b)(A).
82

Jalo, 557 P.2d at 1361.

83

See OR.

84415

REV. STAT.

§ 163.475(3) (1975)(repealed by 1981 c.892 S98).

U.S. 308 (1974).

SJalo, 557 P.2d at 1362.
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court erred in declaring that a mistrial occurred at the first trial.8 6 Therefore, the
second trial was barred by the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.87
2. Massachusetts
88

In a Massachusetts case, the police had found the defendant and the
complainant naked outside of the defendant's car in a vacant parking lot.8 9 At trial,
the defendant claimed ihat the sexual intercourse was consensual and sought to
introduce evidence that the alleged victim had been found in similar situations on
two prior occasions and, subsequently, was charged with prostitution each time. 90
The accused wanted to introduce this evidence to show that the victim may have
been motivated to accuse him of rape in order to avoid any further prosecution. 9'
In reversing the trial court's ruling that the proffered evidence was barred by the
Massachusetts rape shield statute, 92 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that, in certain circumstances, evidence of prior acts or statements may be
relevant to show a complainant's motive to falsely accuse the defendant. 93 The
Court held that the rape shield statute cannot abridge the defendant's right to a
reasonable cross-examination to show the victim's motive. 94
The Massachusetts court also addressed the relevancy of the testimony proffered
by the defendant, stating that relevancy "depends on whether [the evidence] has a
'rational tendency to prove an issue in the case."' 95 The court found that the
evidence the defendant wanted to introduce was so similar to the circumstances
surrounding the alleged rape that it could not say that the evidence had no rational
tendency to prove that the alleged victim was motivated to fabricate rape charges
against the defendant in order to avoid further prosecution. 96 Therefore, the trial
court's exclusion of the evidence was reversible error.97
86

1d.

871d.

88

Commonwealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181 (Mass. 1981).

89

1d. at 183.

90M. The alleged rape occurred on December 2, 1977. Id. The two prior arrests for
prostitution that the accused wanted to introduce at trial occurred in May and September of
1977. Id. While the Massachusetts court does not address the proximity of the three dates, the
closeness in time of the three occasions doubtless had an effect on the court's decision that the
evidence had great probative value.
91

Joyce, 415 N.E.2d at 184.

92

See MASS.GEN.LAWS ch. 233, § 21B (1983).

93

Joyce, 415 N.E.2d at 186. The court did not find it necessary to address the constitutional issues raised by the defendant and the Commonwealth, because it found that the trial
judge had misapplied the rape shield statute. Id. at 184.
94

1d.

95

1d. at 187.

96

1d.

97

Joyce, 415 N.E.2d at 183.
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3. New Mexico
The Supreme Court of New Mexico has held similarly that the New Mexico rape
shield law98 permits the introduction of evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct
when the evidence tends to prove that the alleged victim acted as a prostitute on the
occasion, consented to sex, and subsequently fabricated a claim of rape. 99 But the
Court also concluded that a defendant must make a showing that there is evidence to
support a theory of fabrication before being allowed to introduce evidence of prior
acts of prostitution. 0
He
Two women accused the defendant of raping them on different occasions.'
alleged that the sexual acts were consensual, that both women were engaged in
prostitution on the nights of the alleged rapes, and that during the course of "these
acts for which [the defendant] was paying money, he did things which annoyed,
angered, and in some ways, frightened these women."'0 2 The trial court denied the
defendant's motion to offer such testimony and he was convicted.'0 3
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Mexico recognized that an accusation of
fabrication on the part of the victim necessarily implicates the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation0 4 but affirmed the trial court's ruling excluding
in his motion that
the proffered evidence' because the defendant never mentioned
06
he wished to show that the victims had a motive to fabricate.
C. Case Law Supporting the Exclusion of Evidence of a Victim's Sexual History to
Prove a Motive to Fabricate
Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Olden, many courts have excluded
evidence similar to that in Olden. In applying the balancing test proscribed by
Federal Rule of Evidence 403,' these courts have determined that the probative
value that would be added by the introduction of such evidence would be
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the
issues.0 8 These courts have decided that the victim would be harmed by the
98

N.M.

99

STAT. ANN.

§ 30-9-11-9-18 (Michie 1978). SCRA 1986, Rule I1-413, subd. A.

State v. Johnson, 944 P.2d 869, 872 (N.M. 1997).

'I°d.

'O'Id.at 871.
1021d.
1031d.
104U.S. CONST.

amend. VI.

105Johnson, 944 P.2d at 881.
06
1 Id. at 879. At the in camera hearing, the defendant stated that the proffered evidence
should be admitted because it was relevant to his defense of consent. Id. at 880.
"07ln order for evidence to be admitted at trial, it must fall under one of the exceptions
enumerated in Federal Rule of Evidence 412 and it must also satisfy the "other requirements
for admissibility specified in the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rule 403." Advisory
Committee Notes of Federal Rule Evidence 412.
'08See Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998 (7th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 808
(1994): Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d I161 (Pa. 1994).
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admission of evidence of her prior sexual behavior as it relates to her motive to lie." 9
Therefore, they exclude or carefully limit the evidence.'"' Courts justify such
exclusions by determining that the exclusion is mandated by the policy behind rape
shield statutes and the fact that defendants can usually establish the victim's motive
without evidence of the victim's sexual history."'
1. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz'

2

In Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, "3 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed
the trial court's decision to exclude evidence that the complainant's boyfriend was of
a jealous nature." 4 The victim, a college student, had gone to visit her boyfriend
after class but he was not home." 5 She then went to visit another friend who also
was not home, but was invited into the room by his roommate, the defendant.I,6
After the victim decided to stay, the defendant asked for a backrub but she
declined."' The victim also declined to sit on the bed with him.'" The defendant
then sat on the floor next to her, lifted up her shirt, and massaged her breasts." 9
pushed the victim on the bed and ultimately had sexual
After a while, Berkowitz
20
intercourse with her.1
At trial, the defense sought to introduce evidence that the victim and her
boyfriend were having problems because he believed her to be unfaithful.'' The
defendant wished to use the evidence to prove that it was the victim's fear of her
boyfriend's jealousy that motivated her to accuse Berkowitz of rape.22 The trial
court allowed evidence of frequent arguments between the victim and her boyfriend
but excluded
any mention of the content of the arguments or of the victim's alleged
123
infidelity.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence was not offered to prove that
the victim was unfaithful, but rather that she and her boyfriend had argued over
109M.
1Old.

"'Price, supra note 29, at 559.
112641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
1131d.
1141d. at 1163.
161d.

" 7Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1163.
8
"1
1d.

1191d.
I201d.
21

'
1d. at 1165.
1231d.
22
1 Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1165.
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whether she had been unfaithful. 2 4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the
trial court's decision under the abuse of discretion standard dictated by Federal Rule
of Evidence 403.125 In affirming the trial court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
held that the argument "over the issue of her infidelity is so closely tied to the issue
of the victim's fidelity
itself that, for the purposes of the Rape Shield Law, they are
126
one and the same."'
27

2. Stephens v. Miller'

Evidence was excluded for similar reasons in Stephens v. Miller.2 ' The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, divided sharply on
whether the trial court improperly balanced the evidence under Federal Rule 403,
and therefore, abused its discretion in excluding evidence related to the victim's
motive to fabricate. 29 In Stephens, the defendant was charged
with attempted rape.
30
The defendant and the victim told two different stories. 1
Stephens admitted that he and the victim engaged in consensual intercourse.'
Stephens offered, by way of explanation to the victim's charges, that he had made
comments during intercourse that angered her. 3 Specifically, the defendant sought
to testify that he said to the victim, while they were "doing it doggy fashion," "don't
you like it like this ... Tim Hall said you did."' 33 He also asserted that he made a

statement about the victim's enjoyment of "switching partners."' 34 Stephens stated
that, after he made the statements, the victim became angry and ordered him to leave
her trailer.'
The trial court allowed the defendant to testify only that he said
"something" that made the victim angry. 36

24

1 1d.

125This is the standard of review in determining whether a trial court erred in excluding or
admitting evidence.
126Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1165.
12713

F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 808 (1994).

12Sld.
29
1

d. The Court was split six to five in favor of affirming the district court's ruling
denying admission of the proffered evidence. Id.
'30 d at 1000-1. The victim claimed that she awoke to find Stephens standing in the front
door of her trailer. Id. She said he sat down next to her and tried to kiss her. Id. After a few
moments, she claimed he threw her down on the sofa, covered her mouth, and ripped her shirt.
Id. When he reached down to undo his pants, the victim testified that she was able to get away

from the victim and ran into her sister and brother-in-law's bedroom; Stephens fled. Id.
.3'Miller, 13 F.3d at 998, 1000-1.
3

1 21d.

133Id.

The evidence was introduced at an in camera hearing.

1341d.

135Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1001.
36

1d. at 1002.
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In affim-ing the trial court's ruling, the Seventh Circuit found no constitutional
violation. The Court justified its holding by reasoning that the defendant was
allowed to tell his version of the facts, except for the excluded evidence.' 37 Stephens
was able to testify in front of the jury that he said something that angered the victim
and that the statements subsequently motivated her to fabricate the attempted rape
charge.'
The court held that the trial court properly balanced Stephens' right to
testify against the State of Indiana's interests because it allowed him to testify about
what happened during the alleged rape without causing embarrassment and
humiliation to the victim, and therefore, Stephens was not deprived of his
constitutional right to testify.' 9
Five judges dissented from the plurality opinion. In his dissent, Judge Cummings
stated:
The plausibility of Stephens' defense turned in substantial part on whether
the jury could be persuaded that something Stephens had said to the
complainant could have so enraged her that she would have responded in
the manner alleged. Central to Stephens' case then are the words he
claims to have said that night, words the jury never heard . ..The jury

might well have disbelieved Stephens' testimony even if he had testified
fully; however, it is hard to imagine his story being believed absent this
evidence."14

But the majority stated that the rape shield statute was enacted to prevent "just
this kind of generalized inquiry into the reputation or past sexual conduct of the
victim in order to avoid embarrassing her and subjecting her to possible public
The plurality failed to differentiate reputation evidence from
denigration."''
evidence that would support a claim that the victim had a motive to fabricate the
charges. As stated by the dissent:
The testimony Stephens sought to offer, however, neither sought to prove
the victim's character nor was intended to address the question of consent.
Rather than attempting to prove the truth of any matter about [the
victim's] character, Stephens . . . wanted to offer his story to show its

effect on the listener ...[I]t is evidence of a motive to fabricate.'42
3. Criticism
Stephens and Berkowitz are examples of a court's willingness to protect the
victim and her credibility at the cost of the defendant's ability to present relevant
evidence. The respective courts only admitted a portion of the evidence proffered by
the defendants. As a result, the juries were not exposed to the real reasons why the
3

1 71d.

138id.

'391d. at 1002-03.
'"'Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1010 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
141d. at

1002.
/d. at 1012 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).

42

1
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defendants argued that the victims fabricated the charges. Rather, each jury had a
part of the defendant's story with which to determine the victim's credibility. In
both cases, the court determined that the proffered testimony went to the victim's
character and the reputation of her chastity, rather than to prove her motive.' 43
The courts erred in their holdings, because the evidence the defendants sought to
introduce was not offered to prove character; nor was the evidence "one and the
same" for the purposes of determining fidelity in Berkowitz' and the victim's
enjoyment of sex in a particular position in Stephens.'
Had the defendants been
allowed to offer the particularity of the evidence they wished to present, the
questioning would have been more limited and less prejudicial to the victims than if
they were forced to answer questions about their fidelity or sexual preferences.
Furthermore, the trial judge could have given the jury instructions explaining how
they should and should not use the evidence.'46
D. Case Law Applying the MarylandRape Shield Statute's UlteriorMotive
Exception
The constitutional rights of a defendant to confrontation and to present effective
evidence"' 7 have been implemented by a specific exception under the Maryland rape
shield law 4 ' that permits the court to admit evidence of ulterior motive showing
other sexual conduct if it is relevant and material, and its prejudicial nature does not
outweigh its probative value. In the two cases that have been decided by the
Maryland Court of Appeals concerning a defendant's right to present evidence of the
victim's sexual history as it relates to her motive to fabricate, the court reached
opposing decisions.
1. Case Law Excluding Ulterior Motive Evidence Under the Maryland Statute
In White v. State, 49 the alleged victim stated that she was using a public
telephone when the defendants pulled up beside her in their van, kidnapped her, and
repeatedly raped her."' The defendants insisted that they had purchased and smoked
crack cocaine with the victim but ignored her "suggestive moves" and rejected her
offers to trade her body for drugs. 5'
At trial, the defendants claimed that they never had sexual intercourse with the
complainant. They sought to introduce the testimony of a third person, who would
testify that the complainant previously had offered to trade sex for cocaine with other
143See

Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994); Stephens v. Miller, 13

F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1994)(en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 808 (1994).
144See supra notes 113-26 and accompanying text.
'45See supra notes 128-42 and accompanying text.
146FED. R. EvID. 105.
47

Thomas v. State, 483 A.2d 6 (Md. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1088 (1985).

1

148Id.

149598 A.2d 187 (Md. 1991).
'

5

Old. at 189.

5

'Id. at 190.
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individuals 5 2 in order to prove that she falsely accused them out of anger that they
had failed to procure more drugs for her and refused her sexual advances.' 5 4 The

trial court excluded the proffered evidence and the defendants were convicted.
The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The court
held that the proffered testimony might have some relevance but that any probative
value that existed was far outweighed by its prejudicial effect.'55 The court reasoned
that admitting the testimony "would have invited the jurors to stray into collateral
matters that would have obscured the issues before them,"' 56 defeating the purpose of

the statute to keep jurors focused on the specific issues in the case.
2. Case Law Admitting Ulterior Motive Evidence Under the Maryland Statute

In a later case, however, the court reversed the lower court's decision excluding
evidence that the victim had exchanged sex for drugs one week prior to the alleged
rape. "' In Johnson v. State, the complainant admitted at an in camera hearing' that
she had "freaked" ' for crack cocaine for a period of six months prior to the
occasion in question. 6 ° She stated that when she wanted to get high, she would
engage in sex for crack cocaine at any time of the day or night. 6 ' The victim denied
"freaking" on the night of the alleged rape, even though she admitted to having
binged on crack cocaine for most of that evening and night.'62
At trial, the defendant raised consent as a defense and alleged that the
complainant had accused him of rape as a result of his failure to "pay" her after
The trial court refused to admit the evidence of her prior
sexual intercourse. 6
"freaking"'' 64 stating, "just because she had done it in the past, doesn't show ... any

112Id. Defense counsel later expanded the proffered testimony to include evidence that
Luther Moore, on several occasions, participated in trading sex for drugs with the
complainant. Id.
'13 White, 598 A.2d at 192. The defendants also suggested that she might have fabricated

the rape story so that her fiance would not get mad because she had been smoking cocaine
with two men. Id. at 193.
1541d. at 190. The jury found the defendants guilty of first and second degree rape, assault
with intent to rape, assault, kidnapping, and theft. Id.
'Id. at 193.
56

1 1d.

157Johnson v. State, 632 A.2d 152 (Md. 1991).

158d
' 59"Freaking" means the act of exchanging sex for drugs. Id. at 153.
16°M. at 153-54.
161id
162Johnson, 632 A.2d at 153-54.
63
1 Id at

153.

at 154.
'64MId.
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ulterior motive or [that] it's going to make it safe for her in the community'65
[T]he prejudicial factor is greater than any probative fact .... 166
In holding that it was reversible error to preclude the defendant from crossexamining the complainant about her freaking, the Maryland Court of Appeals
stated:
As we have seen, the critical issue in this case is whether, on this
occasion, the victim was freaking for cocaine or was raped. And, because
these are the only possible explanations for what occurred, evidence that
she freaked for cocaine in the past and, particularly, the very recent past,
has special relevance to that issue; such evidence transcends mere.
evidence of bad character or, in the context of this case, sexual
promiscuity. In turn, it is relevant to, and probative of, the victim's
motive. From a finding that on this occasion she was freaking for cocaine
but did not receive the bargained for cocaine, the jury could then infer that
the victim had an ulterior motive for making a false accusation of rape
against the [defendant]. 67
In so holding, the court recognized that, in some circumstances, evidence of the
complainant's sexual history must be admitted in order to allow the defendant to
properly defend himself against rape charges that he alleges are fabricated. In
distinguishing White, the Johnson court observed,
[I]n White, the issue was not whether the victim had exchanged sex for
Under the
drugs, but rather, whether she had been raped at all. 6
circumstances, there could be no direct relationship between the proffered
testimony of the witness who would have testified to the victim's
with him and the ulterior
previously having engaged in sex for drugs
69
motives the defendant[s] offered in defense.
As evidenced by Johnson and White, the Maryland statute may not be used to
exclude probative evidence, unless its probative value is outweighed by the State's
interest in protecting the rape victim from harassment and humiliation at trial. In that
situation, its exclusion does not violate the defendant's constitutional right of
confrontation, or his right to present an effective defense. 7 °

165The trial judge's statement referred to the defendant's argument that her motive to
fabricate the charges of rape may have been to protect her reputation in the community. Id. at
154, n.4. The defendant proffered that the complainant may have believed that accusing a
"customer" of rape who did not pay for sex would preclude other customers from attempting
to rip her off. Id.
66
1 Id. at 154.
1671d. at 159-60.
168The court would have been more correct had it said "whether she had sexual intercourse

at all" because the defendants denied having any sexual contact with the victim.
169 Johnson, 632 A.2d at 160.
170See Thomas v. State, 483 A.2d 6 (Md. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1088 (1985).
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IV. STATUTES WITHOUT A MOTIVE TO LIE EXCEPTION SHOULD BE AMENDED

Courts do not have a uniform approach as to when evidence of a victim's motive
to fabricate should be admissible at trial. As the federal and most state statutes are
now written, courts must determine if an exclusion of evidence relating to the
victim's motive to fabricate is in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to conduct a reasonable cross-examination and to present testimony in his own
defense.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Olden, many courts have looked to its
holding to determine whether the evidence proffered in the case before them would
violate the defendant's constitutional rights if it was excluded.'' These courts tend
to focus on the harassment and safety of the victim.
Rape shield statutes, like Federal Rule of Evidence 412, must set forth specific
guidelines and requirements for courts to follow in determining whether a defendant
to prove her motive for
may introduce evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct
71 2
fabricating the rape or sexual assault charges against him.'
A. Amending FederalRule of Evidence 412 to Include an Exception for Evidence of
an UlteriorMotive
A defendant in a rape or sexual assault case who is prohibited from introducing
evidence that he was falsely accused may be unable to defend himself against the
charges. An innocent man may be convicted, because the trial court was unsure
whether the evidence was admissible. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 should be
amended to include an exception 173 that specifically admits sexual history evidence
of a motive to fabricate. 174 Courts deciding the admissibility of such evidence would
decision on constitutional grounds under the "catch-all"
not have to base their
1 75
exception of the rule.
1. Safeguards
Proponents of the current federal rape shield law may argue that creating an
exception for evidence that supports a claim that a victim has an ulterior motive in
accusing the defendant would allow criminal defendants to introduce potentially
embarrassing and humiliating evidence of the victim's sexual history. This should
not be the result, however, because courts would still have the discretion to preclude
76
evidence of little or no probative value or that could result in serious misuse. 1

17'See State
72

1 See Part

v. Johnson, 944 P.2d 869 (N.M 1991).

IV.A.

73

1 "[An] exception to [the rape shield statute] should not be carved out liberally.
Nonetheless, the desire to shield rape victims from harassment must yield in certain cases to
another vital goal, the accused's right to present his defense." Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998,
1010 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (6-5 decision) (Cummings, J., dissenting).
174The amendment this paper is suggesting is similar to article 27, section 461(a)(3) of the
Maryland Code.
175See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(l)(C).
176 Price,

supra note 29, at 573.
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First, courts are bound by Federal Rule of Evidence 402 to exclude evidence that
is irrelevant to the facts at issue in the case.'77 Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines
relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence ...more probable or less probable than . . . without the
evidence."' 78 Therefore, courts would be able to exclude evidence that does not
pertain to any issue in the case.
While relevance may be an easy standard to meet, 179 courts can use Federal Rule
of Evidence 403 to determine if the probative value of the evidence is "substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury ..
."'go
If a trial court determines the proffered testimony to be too
prejudicial, it may be excluded. On the other hand, if the evidence of the
complainant's sexual conduct is determined to have strong probative value that she
may have lied about being raped, the court may allow the defendant to put forth the
evidence in his defense.
As Federal Rule of Evidence 412 is currently written, it does not expressly
mention that a court should consider the relevancy and probative value versus
prejudicial nature of the evidence sought to be introduced. 8' Rather, the rule states,
"the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise admissible under these rules
.... 82 By merely referring to the "rules" in general, the statute is not stressing the
importance that rules 401-403 have on any evidence that is admissible under the
exceptions of the statute. Instead, Congress should amend the federal rule to state
expressly that evidence falling under the motive to fabricate exception, as well as the
current exceptions to the general exclusion, must be relevant and more probative
than prejudicial.
Amending the rule to include an ulterior motive exception as well as guidelines
with which to apply the exception would help trial courts to better understand when
sexual history evidence should be admissible. In addition, the guidelines would
encourage a balancing of the policy reasons behind rape shield laws, including public
denigration and embarrassment of the victim, with the defendant's right to present
testimony in his defense and the necessity of the evidence to the defense.' 83
2. Proposed Language
In order to avoid confusion, Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 412 should expressly
provide for the admission of evidence that tends to prove that a complainant has a
motive to fabricate rape or sexual assault charges against the accused. In addition,
the rule should provide that evidence may be admitted only if it is relevant to an
issue in the case and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial nature. To clarify

177FED.

R. EVID.402.

8

17 FED. R. EVID. 401.

179Price, supra note 29, at 573.
80

1

FED

R. EVID. 403.

8

' 'See FED. R. EvID. 412(b).
1821d. Emphasis added.
83

1

See Johnson v. State, 632 A.2d 152 (Md. 1991).
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the ambiguities in the federal rape shield law, Federal Rule of Evidence 412 should
be amended to read as follows:
RULE 412. SEX OFFENSE CASES; RELEVANCE OF ALLEGED VICTIM'S
PAST SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OR ALLEGED SEXUAL PREDISPOSITION
The following evidence is not
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible.
alleged sexual misconduct
involving
criminal
proceeding
admissible in any civil or
except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in
other sexual behavior.
(2)
Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual
predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) In a criminal case, the f.ll.wing vid n. is admissible, i
ethcr:'isze admiziblc undcr these rulez evidence of specific instances of the
victim's prior sexual conduct is admissible only if the judge finds that the
evidence is relevant in the case and that its inflanmatory or prejudicial
nature does not outweigh its probative value, and if the evidence is:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by
the alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than the
accused was the source of semen, injury or other physical
evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by
the alleged victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual
misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent or by the
prosecution; [and]
(C) evidence that supports a claim that the victim has an
ulterior motive in accusing the defendant of the crime: or
(D) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the
constitutional rights of the defendant. 4
V. CONCLUSION
Rape shield laws were enacted to protect the victim from embarrassment and
humiliation at the trial of the accused and to encourage victims to report the rape or
sexual assault. By creating a shield to protect the victim, however, Congress and
state legislatures also succeeded in shielding the victim from facing examination of
her motive for making the accusation. Thus, the criminal defendant's rights to
conduct a reasonable cross-examination and to present an effective defense became
restricted.
The United States Supreme Court's rulings in Davis v. Alaska and Olden v.
Kentucky hold that an absolute restriction on a defendant's right to examine a
victim's motive to fabricate cannot be justified by the interests protected by rape
shield statutes. Currently, courts face difficulty in determining whether such
evidence should be admissible. Therefore, Federal Rule of Evidence 412 should be
amended to include an ulterior motive exception to permit the admission of relevant
84

The underlining indicates new language, and the crossed out language indicates deleted
language.
1
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sexual history evidence when its probative value is not outweighed by its
inflammatory or prejudicial nature.
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